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A B S T R A C T
Practitioners as well as scholars of European integration have
for decades debated why it takes so long for the European
Union (EU) to adopt legislation and how to improve 
decision-making efficiency. Four studies have investigated 
decision-making speed using survival analysis, a particularly
appropriate quantitative technique. In this paper I show that
all four studies suffer from serious methodological problems
that render their conclusions unreliable. I then outline where
work in this area should focus, and take an initial step in this
direction by fitting a methodologically more appropriate
survival model to my 2002 EU decision-making data set
(Golub, 2002). Substantively, the results indicate that
throughout the EU’s history, for the most important types of
legislation, qualified majority voting (QMV) and EU enlarge-
ment have increased decision-making speed, whereas
empowerment of the European Parliament and extreme
preference heterogeneity amongst decision-makers have
decreased it. Theoretically, formal approaches – spatial
models and especially coalition theory – do a better job of
explaining these results than do perspectives that privilege
informal norms.
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Practitioners as well as scholars of European integration have for decades
pondered why it takes so long for legislation to make its way through the
complex European Union (EU) institutional structure and how to improve
decision-making efficiency. After years of disagreement and ineffective
declarations, the 1987 Single European Act (SEA), the 1993 Maastricht Treaty
and, to a much lesser extent, the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam expanded the scope
of qualified majority voting (QMV) in order to improve legislative efficiency
(Garrett, 1992; Moravcsik, 1998: 317; Tsebelis and Kreppel, 1998: 65). These
institutional reforms are credited with expediting decisions and facilitating
paralysis-free enlargement of the Union. As a result, the integration process
was, until recently, viewed as ‘a never ending success story’ (Schneider, 2002).
Member states, it seemed, had found the means to reconcile speed and an ever-
expanding membership. But the deeply inadequate Nice Treaty of 2001 and
the planned addition of 10 new states in 2004 soon raised concerns about a
potential end to the previously harmonious combination of deepening and
widening (Schneider, 2002; Steunenberg, 2002).
The study of decision-making speed holds both substantive and theor-
etical importance. Determining what actually produces or averts legislative
paralysis is substantively essential for informed decisions about the EU’s
future, particularly the possible need for more QMV, the potential adverse
by-products of European Parliamentary power, and whether the EU can
function with such a large and diverse membership. Beyond this, findings
about speed have theoretical implications for how to study EU decision-
making. They speak to the relevance of spatial and coalition models and of
formal rules versus informal norms.
Survival analysis, a technique for exploring why things endure, is
perfectly suited for investigating EU decision-making speed. My first
objective is to show that the four previous studies of decision-making speed
that used survival analysis (Golub, 1999, 2002; König, 2007; Schulz and König,
2000) employed it in methodologically inappropriate ways that render their
conclusions fundamentally suspect. Because they used different data sets,
covariates and model specifications, the studies reached different conclusions,
but whether or not the findings agree is irrelevant since none is reliable. After
establishing the need, in effect, to wipe the slate clean, my second objective
is to begin the reconstruction process.
I proceed as follows. After a theoretical discussion of the potential deter-
minants of EU decision-making speed, I identify serious methodological
problems in the previous survival analyses of EU decision-making that under-
mine their conclusions. Focusing on the most important type of legislation, I
then derive preliminary, but more reliable, conclusions about EU decision-
making speed. The main substantive findings suggest that, over the course
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of EU history, QMV and enlargement have each expedited decision-making,
whereas the formal involvement of the European Parliament and extreme
heterogeneity in the preferences of decision-makers have slowed it down.
Theoretically, formal approaches – spatial models, and especially coalition
theory – account much better for these results than do perspectives that
privilege informal norms.
Theoretical explanations for decision-making speed
Observers have consistently stressed that the EU legislative process gets
bogged down as institutional obstacles or diversity of preferences amongst
decision-makers increase. In the 1970s they attributed symptoms of paralysis
to the Council’s alleged reluctance to apply the original treaty’s QMV
provisions and to the 1973 enlargement, which, they concluded, had exacer-
bated conflict and made Council agreement more difficult to reach (European
Communities, 1976; Sasse et al., 1977; Wallace et al., 1977). In subsequent
decades, each successive round of accessions brought calls for more QMV in
order to avert paralysis caused by an ever-larger, more diverse Union (Dinan,
2004: 178; Tsebelis and Kreppel, 1989: 63). After several treaty reforms in this
direction, the planned entry of 10 new states and the limitations on QMV in
the Nice Treaty renewed debates over the dangers of paralysis.
The longstanding focus on institutions and preferences seems intuitively
reasonable, but how exactly do they relate to legislative paralysis? Spatial
models and coalition theory provide two possible links, in that policy stability
should depend on changes to the core, the win-set, and the proportion of
winning coalitions (Hosli and van Deemen, 2002; Tsebelis, 2002). In the
context of spatial models, the core is the set of policies that cannot be changed
by a counterproposal given a particular decision rule, whereas the win-set 
of the status quo is the set of policies that can defeat the status quo. Larger
cores are more likely to contain the status quo, thereby increasing legislative
stability, whereas smaller win-sets increase inertia by reducing the number of
alternatives that actors prefer to the status quo (Schneider et al., 2006; Tsebelis,
2002). The two concepts are ‘quasi-equivalent’ (Tsebelis, 2002: 26) and ‘lead
to the same analytical results . . . [since] the larger the size of the core the
smaller the winset of the status quo’ (Tsebelis and Yataganas, 2006: 433).
Coalition theory makes the straightforward prediction that, as it becomes
numerically easier to form a winning coalition, policy becomes less stable and
easier to change.
In the extreme case, stability precludes the adoption of new legislation
regardless of how long the actors negotiate. Short of this, inertia should
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manifest itself in protracted negotiations since, with a larger core, smaller 
win-set or smaller proportion of winning coalitions, the more agreements are
delayed until an actor shifts positions (e.g. the arrival of a new government)
or a winning coalition crafts a complex package deal involving the intro-
duction of a new dimension. To explain variation in decision-making speed
I first focus on three factors from formal theory that affect the core, the 
win-set and the proportion of winning coalitions: voting rules, veto players
and actor preferences. I then consider an alternative theoretical perspective
that privileges informal norms.
Voting rules
Compared with unanimity, where decision-making is painfully slow (Neyer,
2004: 29; Scharpf, 2001), QMV should expedite decisions for two separate
reasons. First, QMV should make Council agreement easier to reach by
reducing the size of the core and expanding the size of the win-set of the
status quo (Steunenberg, 2002; Tsebelis, 2002). Second, QMV should speed up
decisions by increasing the proportion of winning coalitions in the Council
and thereby reducing the capacity of individual states to block legislation
(Hosli and van Deemen, 2002; Selck, 2006; Steunenberg, 2002).
Veto players
According to spatial models, any increase in the number of veto players,
unless they are located within the preferences of the previous players (i.e.
‘absorbed’), will enlarge the core and shrink the win-set, which should make
policies more stable (Tsebelis, 2002). Under no conditions will additional veto
players shrink the core and destabilize policies. There are six instances in EU
history where the number of veto players has changed. Five enlargements
gave new member states veto power in the Council, and the EP became a
veto player as its formal powers grew from consultation to cooperation or co-
decision (Tsebelis, 2002). Evidence to date suggests that new member states
were only partly absorbed, whether on the pro/anti-integration, left/right or
individual policy sector dimensions (Franchino, 2006: ch. 4; Hayes-Renshaw
and Wallace, 1997; König, 2007; Michalski and Wallace, 1992; Schneider et al.,
2006); some enlargements exacerbated these divides, others decreased them.1
And evidence strongly suggests that the EP was certainly not absorbed. It
tends to hold extreme preferences (Selck, 2006), so its formal involvement
should increase heterogeneity and produce the same sort of effect as adding
an outlier member state.
According to coalition theory, enlargement should make agreement more
difficult under unanimous voting regardless of whether or not new members
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are absorbed, because it decreases the proportion of winning coalitions (Hosli
and van Deemen, 2002; Steunenberg, 2002). This should slow decision-
making (Schneider et al., 2006). Practically, though, since with only six
member states less than 1.6% of unanimous coalitions were winning, a further
reduction might have had no significance. Enlargement should not slow
decisions made under QMV, however, since in the Council only connected
coalitions form (those where governments are adjacent in the policy space)
and therefore the proportion of connected winning coalitions (CWCs) remains
fairly stable (Hosli and van Deemen, 2002).2 In fact, going from 6 to 9 states
or from 12 to 15 actually increases the proportion of CWCs, so that enlarge-
ment should accelerate decision-making speed.
Simulations largely confirm this optimistic picture of the relationship
between enlargement and legislative inertia, even if we allow for non-
connected coalitions. Based on their results, enlargement, whether from 6 to
10 or from 15 to 27 states, should not significantly slow decision-making
under QMV, regardless of the dimensionality of the issue space (Selck, 2006;
Steunenberg, 2002). Under unanimity in a one-dimensional space, enlarge-
ment from 6 to 10 should slow decisions slightly, but after that point inertia
is already so high that there is diminishing harm from each additional
enlargement. In two or three dimensions, however, the negative effects of
enlargement diminish much more gradually (Selck, 2006: 44–6).
Preferences
With the number of veto players fixed, any increase in the heterogeneity (i.e.
range) of the preferences of decision-makers will also enlarge the core and
shrink the win-set of the status quo (Tsebelis, 2002: 30). There are numerous
instances when shifts in EU actors’ preference heterogeneity might have
occurred, the most obvious being after every national and EP election.
Evidence shows that heterogeneity on a variety of dimensions has fluctuated
enormously with government turnover and particularly the presence of
national leaders (or coalitions) with extreme views. For example, by far the
greatest left–right divergence occurred soon after the arrival of Margaret
Thatcher as UK prime minister in 1979 (Franchino, 2006). Based on spatial
models, we would therefore predict the pace of EU decision-making to alter
after each election, getting slower (faster) as preference heterogeneity
increased (decreased).
Informal norms
Theoretical perspectives that emphasize the importance of informal norms,
rather than the formal rules integral to spatial models or coalition theory, offer
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very different predictions from those set out above. The first is that QMV
expedited decisions in only some periods of EU history. According to the
Luxembourg Compromise thesis, following French President Charles de
Gaulle’s threats to leave the EC (Wallace and Winand, 2006), decisions were
made by ‘de facto unanimity voting even where QMV was authorised’
(Moravcsik, 1998: 315). Allegedly this resulted in the (semi)paralysis of EC
decision-making for the next two decades (Tsebelis and Kreppel, 1998;
Peterson and Bomberg, 1999). Formal rules became effective only in the
second period of EU history, once the SEA renounced the Compromise and
expanded the scope of QMV (Ehlermann, 1990; Moravcsik, 1998; Parsons,
2003; Peterson and Bomberg, 1999).
Many believe that informal norms once again trump formal rules in the
third, and current, period of EU history, marked by the 1993 Maastricht
Treaty. Assessments of post-1993 decision-making claim that Council and
COREPER (Committee of Permanent Representatives) delegates disregard
formal voting rules and prolong negotiations until they reach a ‘unanimous
consensus’ (Heisenberg, 2005; Joerges and Neyer, 1997). This might be due
to a post-Maastricht backlash by member states and the public against
centralization of power in Brussels and perceived abuses of QMV (Pollack,
2000). A unanimous consensus norm would rob QMV of its effects on the
size of the core as well as on the proportion of winning coalitions, and thus
on decision-making speed.
A second prediction is that, owing to the informal dynamics of ‘deliber-
ative interaction’, adding more actors (i.e. voices) to the decision-making
process has a neutral effect or even expedites legislation (Neyer, 2004: 30).
This theoretical position accords with observations by some that the co-
operation and co-decision procedures steadily improved the EU’s democratic
legitimacy without encumbering its decision-making process (Dinan, 1994:
276; Ehlermann, 1990: 1107).
Third, this perspective makes predictions about the effects of veto players
that hinge on assumptions regarding whether or not formal rules actually
mattered across different periods of EU history. If the Luxembourg Compro-
mise thesis is correct, and especially if ‘unanimous consensus’ has been a
constant characteristic of Council negotiations even after the SEA, then every
enlargement would have negative effects since each new member state could
veto all proposals and the proportion of winning coalitions would drop rapidly
towards zero even if we assume that only connected coalitions form. Other
possibilities are that QMV was actually effective during the Luxembourg
Compromise period as the EC grew from 6 to 12 states, or it became effective
after the third enlargement and has remained so ever since, or it was 
effective only during the 1987–93 period. In short, the more that formal voting
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rules mattered throughout EU history, the greater the expected effects of insti-
tutional reforms and the less the expected negative effects of enlargements.
Previous survival analyses of EU decision-making speed
To date, what has quantitative analysis of empirical evidence taught us about
the pace of legislative decision-making? Has QMV had the expected effects,
and throughout all historical periods? Has the EU managed to deepen and
widen harmoniously? If so, what are the implications for the various
theoretical propositions discussed above?
Unlike some other quantitative approaches, survival analysis is perfectly
suited for investigating factors related to decision-making speed.3 Four
studies have applied this method to different data. Golub (1999) examined all
1141 proposals for Directives made between January 1974 and December 1996.
To compile his data set he used the EU’s CELEX and APC (now called Prelex)
databases, augmented by hard copies of COM documents and the Official
Journal. Drawing data from CELEX, Schulz and König (2000) examined 5183
proposals for Directives, Regulations and Decisions made between January
1984 and December 1994. König (2007) extended this to all proposals made
between 1984 and 1998. Golub (2002) examined all 1669 proposed Directives
made between 1968 and 1998. Extensive use of COM documents and the
Official Journal was essential for the pre-1974 period when the coverage of the
electronic databases deteriorates.
The studies also used different covariates to capture the effects on
decision-making speed of institutional rules and the configuration of member
state preferences. Although in a few respects the studies disagree about the
effects of institutional rules and national preferences, for the most part their
findings are not so much conflictual as just different. This is hardly surpris-
ing given the disparities in time-span covered, data and variables. Of particu-
lar note is that Golub focused exclusively on Directives and sheds no light on
what determines the pace of adoption for Regulations or Decisions. These are
the two most common types of instrument and the ones that predominate in
the other studies. Because of the short time periods they cover and their
chosen coding schemes, neither Schulz and König (2000) nor König (2007)
have anything to say about many issues that Golub addresses: EU enlarge-
ment, the Luxembourg Compromise, the effects of institutional changes made
by the SEA and Maastricht, formal rules versus informal norms, the effects
of legislative backlog or the presence of extremist governments such as that
of Thatcher. Details of the studies’ findings and disparities need not concern
us here, though, because all four suffer from serious methodological problems
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that render their inferences unreliable, regardless of whether they agree or
disagree. In the following section I identify these problems. I then discuss
how we should go about constructing and testing a more satisfactory theory
of EU decision-making speed, and I take an initial step in this direction.
A legacy of heroic assumptions and unreliable results
In order to conduct survival analysis, researchers face two crucial decisions.
One relates to the shape of the baseline hazard rate, another relates to whether
or not the coding and effects of the covariates remain fixed over time. All four
prior survival studies of EU decision-making mishandled these method-
ological decisions.
Assumptions about the baseline hazard
Given an individual legislative proposal under consideration, the hazard rate
is, effectively, the probability that at any given point in time the proposal is
adopted, given that adoption has not yet occurred. The baseline hazard rate
is the underlying effect the passage of time has on the adoption rate once the
independent variables are taken into account. The baseline hazard can take
an infinite variety of shapes, each reflecting a different form of duration
dependence. Duration dependence is more a ‘statistical nuisance’ than an
object of interest, since it is really just unexplained variance that is correlated
with survival time (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 2004).
With parametric models, the researcher must specify the shape for the
baseline hazard. One should select a particular parametric shape only on the
basis of a strong a priori theory. The choice of shape is crucial, since it will
directly affect the estimated coefficients. Fitting a possibly erroneous baseline
hazard function to the data can impart enormous bias to the estimates 
(Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 2004). Fortunately, the alternative Cox semi-
parametric model allows the baseline to take on literally any shape. Simply
put, ‘when you do not have a good a priori reason to know the shape of 
the hazard, you should use [Cox] semiparametric analysis’ (Cleves et al., 
2002: 214).
Three of the previous studies on EU decision-making speed employed
parametric analysis without adequate justification. None based their choice
of the log-logistic baseline form on strong a priori theory, and each used
inherently unreliable diagnostic tests. Golub rejected other parametric forms
on the grounds that plots of the transformed survivor function were not linear,
and rejected a Cox model because stratified hazard plots indicated the
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presence of non-proportionality (1999: 748). To justify a log-logistic model,
Golub (1999) speculated that legislative proposals should face an increasing
chance of adoption up to a certain point, past which they are ‘politically dead’.
The hazard rate would thus rise, peak, then fall. But, lacking a strong theory,
it would be equally reasonable to conjecture that the chances of legislative
adoption are strictly decreasing with time, or that the baseline hazard rate is
bimodal, or even more complex. Schulz and König (2000: 662–3) and König
(2006) also offer no a priori theory about the shape of the baseline hazard,
and rely on the same two diagnostic techniques (transformed survivor and
hazard plots) to justify a log-logistic parametric form.
There are major problems associated with each of these graphical
diagnostics that render them unreliable (Golub, 2007). Using a plot of the
hazard or transformed survivor function assumes that the data are from a
homogeneous population (Allison, 1995: 94), which entails the further
assumption that no covariates are related to survival time. The very fact that
previous studies of decision-making speed developed hypotheses about 
the effects of covariates and engaged in multivariate analysis belies this
assumption. A further fatal problem with both of these graphical methods,
and with an additional diagnostic technique not employed by any of the four
studies, known as Cox–Snell residual plots (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones,
2004; Collett, 2003), is that they lack the power to detect departures from the
assumed model. All these plots can produce beautifully straight lines even
when the model being fit is quite erroneous (Crowley and Storer, 1983).
Assumptions about the coding and effects of covariates
Time-varying covariates (TVCs) are variables that undergo what are known
as state-changes, where the values initially assigned to a case change over
its lifetime. The importance of including TVCs and not coding data with
state-changes as time-constant has been thoroughly demonstrated (Box-
Steffensmeier and Jones, 2004; Golub, 2007).
Three of the four previous survival analyses of EU decision-making
ignored TVCs and wrongly treated all the covariates as time-constant (Golub
1999; König, 2007; Schulz and König, 2000). This assumption is clearly un-
justified. All the key variables identified from spatial models, coalition theory
and perspectives that privilege informal norms are liable to change over the
lifetime of many individual cases as a result of treaty reform, EU enlarge-
ment, government turnover or new modes of actor behaviour – formal voting
rules, the number of veto players, the heterogeneity of actor preferences, and
the presence of a unanimous consensus norm. The presumption that variables
remain fixed over the entire lifetime of each case is manifestly untenable when
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individual legislative proposals under analysis can survive years or even
decades before eventual adoption. For instance, using just his limited set of
TVCs, Golub (2002) showed that nearly half the Directives proposed after
1968 experienced at least one state-change, and some experienced up to 11.
A second unjustified assumption shared by all four prior studies is that
the effects of covariates do not change over time. This is a common assump-
tion in survival analysis. The proportional hazards (PH) assumption
maintains that ‘each observation’s hazard function follows exactly the same
pattern over time’ (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 2004: 132). It is a well-
established fact that violations of the PH assumption can result in enormous
bias and render the estimated coefficients meaningless (Box-Steffensmeier
and Jones, 2004).
The Cox model, as well as most parametric models, makes the PH
assumption. Because this assumption did not hold for their data and co-
variates, Schulz and König (2000) and König (2007) opted for a log-logistic
model, which does not entail the PH assumption. However, they did not
recognize that the log-logistic model makes a similar and equally demand-
ing assumption – that the log-odds are proportional (Collett, 2003: 225–6). For
the ratio of log-odds to be proportional, it must be independent of time, which
is precisely the counterpart to the PH assumption made by other parametric
forms, and just as demanding.
This assumption is also unjustified. For a start, Schulz and König (2000:
662) and König (2007) found empirical evidence of non-proportional effects.
An equally serious problem is that none of the three studies recognized that
by definition neither the PH assumption nor the proportional log-odds
assumption holds when cases undergo state-changes, since every state-
change produces a jump in an individual’s hazard rate that destroys the
proportionality of the hazard ratio (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 2004: 108).
To see why the very presence of TVCs makes the log-odds dependent on
time, and thus no longer proportional, we need to modify the usual survivor
function for the log-logistic parametric model to include TVCs so that the
coding of each covariate x1, x2, . . . xn depends on time. The survivor function
becomes
1
S(t) = ––––––––, where a = exp[–β(x(t))]
1 + (at)p
so that the ratio of the log-odds of survival for any two individuals i and j is
now
Si(t)/[1 – Si(t)]
log ––––———–––– = p log(exp[–β(x(t)j)]) – p log(exp[–β(x(t)i)]) Sj(t)/[1 – Sj(t)]
= p[β(x(t)i – x(t)j)],
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which is dependent on time, regardless of how many covariates one includes
or omits.
Since ‘remedies for nonproportionality in the parametric context are
largely nonexistent’ (Box-Steffensmeier et al., 2003: 40), this is yet another
reason to reject a log-logistic parametric model. Instead we need to fit a Cox
model, which allows reliable identification of proportionality violations and
readily accommodates non-proportional effects of covariates by incorporating
time-interactive terms of the sort B*g(t) where g(t) is some function of survival
time (usually ln(t)) (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 2004).
To sum up, all four prior studies derive their findings from flawed
methods. Three of the studies failed to incorporate TVCs despite the fact that
many individual legislative proposals underwent numerous state-changes on
key variables. The three studies that employed log-logistic parametric models
picked this particular shape without adequate theoretical justification, based
on inherently unreliable diagnostic tests. And all four studies failed to accom-
modate the non-proportional effects of covariates over time, effects that we
know were present in Schulz and König’s (and König’s) data even with time-
constant covariates, and that we know by definition will arise if these data
are coded properly with TVCs.
Before proceeding, it is important to note that there is much to gain and
very little to lose from switching from a log-logistic to a Cox model. The Cox
has some limitations, but ‘none of them is serious’ (Yamaguchi, 1991: 102),
and they are far outweighed by its advantages over parametric models.4 In
particular, with large samples the estimates from a Cox are nearly as efficient
as those from a parametric model, the Cox actually yields more useful and
reliable information about duration dependence, and, unlike the Cox, para-
metric models lack approximation methods to handle tied data (Golub, 2007).
What is to be done?
Without coding TVCs we simply cannot draw any reliable conclusions about
the determinants of decision-making speed or the utility of our available
theoretical tools. We also need data covering a long historical time span if we
want to learn anything about the effects of changing rules, veto players and
preference heterogeneity that resulted from five enlargements and reforms
contained in the SEA, Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice treaties.
Although we can salvage some important insights from previous survival
studies, their data sets provide little help. Data from Golub (1999) are obsolete,
having been replaced by a larger data set that codes for TVCs. Schulz and
König’s (2000) and König’s (2007) data sets will need to be fundamentally
recoded to include a wide array of TVCs. Even after this huge undertaking,
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these two data sets will still cover too short a time to tell us anything about
the Luxembourg Compromise period, the SEA or EU enlargements in 1973,
1981 and 1995.
The best place to start is with my 2002 data set because it is the only one
that codes for TVCs (Golub, 2002). Moreover, even if König’s data were
eventually recoded, analysts will still need to disaggregate Directives for
separate attention since they are the instrument type most likely to deal with
important, complex and controversial issues rather than merely operational
decisions and administrative matters (Peterson and Bomberg, 1999: 48; Schulz
and König, 2000: 658; Thomson et al., 2004: 244). Of course there have been
some important Regulations and Decisions over the years, for example on
mergers and the regional development fund, but on balance Directives are
most contentious, taking far longer to agree than Regulations or Decisions.
Schulz and König (2000: 660–1) report that, for 1984–95, the likelihood of
adoption for Regulations and Decisions peaked after only 45 days and then
rapidly declined towards zero, whereas for Directives it peaked after 508 days
and declined only gradually thereafter. Data from Prelex suggest that
Decisions and Regulations were just as trivial in previous years. For pro-
posals made in 1976, for example, the median time taken to adopt Decisions
and Regulations was just 58 days, compared with 606 days for Directives.
To me, explaining variation in the adoption rate for the most significant
and contentious laws constitutes a much more important task than discerning
how a few more weeks can be shaved from the already short time needed to
pass mostly trivial proposals. Therefore I relax the unjustified assumptions
made by all earlier studies and fit a methodologically more appropriate model
to Golub’s 2002 data. Note that this is superior to just adding a dummy
variable for instrument type (Drüner et al., 2006; Schulz and König, 2000) since
that does not tell us what we want to know; it sheds no light on whether the
effects of voting rules, EP involvement or Council preferences are different for
Directives than for the vast number of routine proposals. An alternative, after
recoding for TVCs, would be to use König’s data even though they are domi-
nated by trivial cases and include a battery of terms that interact with instru-
ment type. But the time span would still be too short and this approach would
eat up degrees of freedom and exacerbate multicollinearity.
Figure 1 presents the yearly trend in decision-making time for the 1669
proposed Directives, along with vertical markings for eight landmarks in EU
history. Table 1 presents the independent variables and coding scheme. The
variables are designed to assess the effect of changes to voting rules, veto
players, actor heterogeneity and the presence of informal rules across three
time periods. Two control variables account for the effects of expanding the
legislative agenda to new policy sectors, where there might be more prefer-
ence heterogeneity, and for accumulation in legislative backlog.
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We know that non-proportional effects are likely even without TVCs,
and are certain with them. Figure 2 shows that, as expected, the log-odds are
not proportional for many covariates, so that a log-logistic model is inappro-
priate. The results of the Grambsch and Therneau test, reported in Table 2,
reveal that for six of the covariates we can reject the null hypothesis of
proportionality (p < .05).
Therefore the appropriate model specification is a Cox that accounts for
state-changes in the data and non-proportional effects in six covariates.
Table 3 reports the estimates from this model. I first discuss the substantive
findings and then the theoretical implications.
Contrary to the Luxembourg Compromise thesis, formal voting rules
were clearly not bypassed prior to the SEA. The QMV coefficient is large and
significant, which indicates that the hazard rate for proposals subject to 
de jure QMV was dramatically higher than for proposals officially under
unanimity. And because the model accounts for non-proportionality, we can,
for the first time, discern how the effects of certain covariates wear off over
the lifetime of legislative proposals. The hazard rate under QMV was 146%
higher than for unanimity after six months of negotiations, and 82% higher
after a year. After surviving four years of Council negotiation, a proposal was
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Figure 1 Survival time for proposed Directives.
Note: For each proposal, survival time is calculated as the number of days between official
proposal and adoption or formal replacement or withdrawal. Because of heavy right-censoring,
survival times for proposals made in 1995 onwards (the dashed line) are dramatically
underestimated.
just as likely to be adopted regardless of which voting procedure officially
applied.5
Further evidence against the Luxembourg Compromise thesis, and
against the standard view of the SEA as a watershed, is that the magnitude
of the QMV effect subsequent to the SEA did not receive a sudden boost but
instead remained statistically indistinguishable from that of the earlier period.
In fact, during the first five months that a proposal spent under consideration
in the Council, the effect of QMV on the hazard rate was actually greater in
the pre-SEA period than it was during the next six years (1988–93).6
The results also indicate that in the post-Maastricht period formal
provisions for QMV, while still effective, had much less impact on decision-
making than they did in earlier years, even less than during the pre-SEA
period. From 1993 to 1999, QMV increased the hazard rate by only 51%
compared with proposals under unanimity. During the first 18 months that
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Table 1 Explanatory variables and coding scheme
Variable name Coding
Formal voting rules QMV 1 = QMV applies before 15 June 1987
0 = unanimity
POSTSEAQMV 1 = QMV applies 16 June 1987 to 
1 November 1993
0 = unanimity
POSTTEUQMV 1 = QMV applies after 1 November 1993
0 = unanimity
European Parliament role COOPERATION 1 = cooperation procedure
0 = no cooperation
CO-DECISION 1 = co-decision procedure
0 = no co-decision
Nine member states EC9 1 = Nine member states
0 = otherwise
Ten member states EC10 1 = Ten member states
0 = otherwise
Twelve member states EC12 1 = Twelve member states
0 = otherwise
Fifteen member states EC15 1 = Fifteen member states
0 = otherwise
Margaret Thatcher THATCHER 1= Thatcher is prime minister
0 = otherwise
Size of legislative backlog BACKLOG 37–229 (measured at time of proposal)
Expanded agenda AGENDA 1 = policy area added by SEA or TEU
0 = otherwise
a proposal spent under consideration in the Council, the effect of QMV on
the hazard rate was larger in the pre-SEA period than during 1993–9. This
suggests that increasing the scope of QMV, as provided for in the Constitution
for Europe, would ease inertia as the EU goes forward but probably not as
much as many would like or expect.
Strong confirmation of the EU as a ‘never ending success story’ is that
successive enlargements did not cut the pace of decision-making. Not only
did decision-making never slow down as a direct result of enlargement, but
the large, positive and statistically significant coefficients for EC9, EC10, EC12
and EC15 indicate that after every single enlargement decision-making was
faster than during the period when Council negotiations involved only six
member states. And it was not that the expansion of QMV offset detrimen-
tal effects of enlargement. The inclusion of separate QMV, QMVPOSTSEA
and QMVPOSTTEU variables controls for voting rule reform and isolates the
effects of enlargement. This bodes well for decision-making speed in a Union
of 25 or more states, although only more recent data will show whether the
2004 enlargement also had a benign effect.
What does appear to bog down decision-making is the presence of a
maverick government. The large, negative and statistically significant
coefficient on THATCHER shows that, while she was UK prime minister, 
the hazard rate for adoptions was still 22% lower after 6 months of nego-
tiations, and the ‘Thatcher effect’ wore off only after a proposal had survived
14 months. Looking ahead, it appears that the real threat to speedy EU
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Table 2 Test of proportional hazards assumption
rho chi2 Df Prob > chi2
QMV –.16771 36.75 1 .0000
QMVPOSTSEA –.05814 4.46 1 .0347
QMVPOSTTEU –.00328 0.02 1 .9018
COOPERATION .24311 81.69 1 .0000
CO-DECISION .15264 29.92 1 .0000
EC9 .01241 0.19 1 .6659
EC10 .00890 0.10 1 .7535
EC12 –.00651 0.05 1 .8158
EC15 –.01530 0.32 1 .5708
THATCHER .09534 12.39 1 .0004
AGENDA –.00985 0.13 1 .7164
BACKLOG –.07693 7.88 1 .0050
GLOBAL TEST 161.66 12 .0000
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Figure 2 Tests of the log-logistic model’s proportional log-odds assumption.
decision-making is not more member states but the election of extremists,
whether in the new or the old members.
An even more worrying finding is that there is a costly trade-off between
efficiency and democratic inclusiveness. Democratic legitimacy conferred on
EU decisions by successive expansions of the European Parliament’s powers
has been purchased at the expense of considerably prolonged decision-
making. The COOPERATION and CODECISION coefficients, read in
conjunction with their respective time-interactive terms and the QMVPOST-
TEU variable, show the enormous drag exerted by Parliamentary involve-
ment. For the cooperation procedure, during 1987–93 this drag actually
outweighed the effects of QMV during the first year of a proposal’s survival
time, and for both the cooperation and co-decision procedures during 1993–9,
it swamped the effects of QMV for the first 18 months of survival time. This
suggests that proposals to shift policy-making from unanimity to co-decision,
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Table 3 Cox model of EU decision-making speed
Variable Coefficient Standard error
QMVa 3.122**** 0.478
QMVPOSTSEAa 2.110**** 0.513
QMVPOSTTEUa 0.413** 0.166
COOPERATIONa –6.041**** 0.614
CODECISIONa –5.001**** 0.876
EU9a 0.496** 0.198
EU10a 0.457* 0.243
EU12a 0.659** 0.257
EU15a 0.571** 0.263
THATCHERa –1.716**** 0.379
AGENDA 0.177 0.191
BACKLOG 0.026**** 0.007
QMV*ln(t) –0.428**** 0.079
QMVSEA*ln(t) –0.224*** 0.085
COOP*ln(t) 0.890**** 0.099
CODEC*ln(t) 0.725**** 0.134
THATCHER*ln(t) 0.282**** 0.061
BACKLOG*ln(t) –0.004*** 0.0009
n 1669
Decision-days 1,800,781
Log-likelihood –8651
Notes: Data are right-censored on 17 December 1999.
**** p < .001, *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .10. 
a Time varying covariate.
such as the Constitution for Europe, might cut the democratic deficit but will
produce no net gain in decision-making speed, and shifts from QMV with
consultation to co-decision will actually exacerbate inertia.
Turning to the control variables, mounting legislative BACKLOG signifi-
cantly accelerates current Council decision-making. This is a healthy organ-
izational response – as the volume of pending proposals grows, this pressures
the Council to reach agreement more quickly on new proposals. The
AGENDA coefficient is statistically insignificant, which indicates that expand-
ing legislative activity to new policy sectors, as was done with the SEA and
the Maastricht Treaty, did not slow decision-making. This should comfort
those who want to see timely action in relatively recent or newly ‘communi-
tized’ areas such as immigration or justice and home affairs.
These findings have two main theoretical implications. First, formal
approaches – spatial models and especially coalition theories – perform well.
As expected, QMV provisions that shrink the core, enlarge the win-set and
raise the proportion of winning coalitions decrease policy stability, one mani-
festation of which is faster decision-making. Adding veto players that are not
absorbed (the EP) enlarges the core, shrinks the win-set and slows decision-
making. With the number of players fixed, a large increase in preference
heterogeneity (Thatcher’s government) produces the same effect. However,
spatial theory cannot fully explain why decision-making accelerated despite
the addition of veto players in 1973, 1981, 1986 and 1995. At most, EU enlarge-
ment would have no significant effect if the core were already very large or
all the new veto players were absorbed. Coalition theory provides a possible
answer: the formation of connected winning coalitions in low-dimensional
space became easier.
Second, perspectives that privilege informal norms have little explanatory
power. There is no evidence that formal voting rules have never mattered or
that the Council has always operated by a unanimity norm. Rather, it appears
that the Council has never operated under an unanimity norm, since QMV
significantly expedited decisions in all three periods (pre-SEA, SEA to
Maastricht, post-Maastricht), and enlargement did not have the anticipated
negative effects. Nor do the results suggest the presence of the informal
dynamics associated with deliberative democracy, since adding the EP as an
extra voice dramatically slowed down decision-making.
This study leaves some important questions unanswered and draws
attention to areas with significant scope for further research. One important
puzzle is why QMV has a larger impact in some periods than in others. To
answer this, much more work is needed to isolate the respective independent
effects of rules and preferences and to explore their potential interactions. For
example, the speed gap between voting procedures could have narrowed in
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recent years because of extreme preference heterogeneity specifically in areas
governed by QMV, or because heterogeneity has eased in areas governed by
unanimity.
A second challenge is to separate the effects of veto players from those
of preference heterogeneity. I used TVCs to reflect the change in veto players
for each enlargement and EP empowerment, and the heterogeneity caused
by one well-known instance of an extremist government, but obviously this
marks only a first step. To push this approach further we need to augment
my veto player TVCs with other TVCs that extend beyond the case of
Thatcher to reflect the fact that the size of the core and status quo win-set
fluctuated with each national and EP election. Efforts to construct periodic
measures of preference heterogeneity offer great promise here (Franchino,
2006; Jupille, 2004; König, 2007; Schneider et al., 2006).
Ideally, the coding of this TVC would factor in the location of the status
quo because recent work suggests that the size of the win-set, which depends
on the status quo, might be an even better predictor than the size of the core,
which does not (Drüner et al., 2006). However, there are major theoretical
obstacles to doing this (Tsebelis, 2002: 23), and apart from these it is highly
impractical – in the most extensive effort to date, the European Union Decides
data set (DEU) (Thomson et al., 2006), the location of the status quo was avail-
able for only 62 cases, all from post-1996. The core and the win-set are
certainly not perfect substitutes, but arguably they are conceptually quasi-
equivalent (Tsebelis and Yataganas, 2006) and have been shown to be nega-
tively correlated (Drüner et al., 2006). Thus if the status quo cannot be located,
practicality suggests that we use the core as an imperfect proxy of the 
win-set in further efforts to distinguish between the effects of veto players
and preference heterogeneity.
Conclusion
Concern over decision-making speed stretches back decades and holds both
substantive and theoretical importance. Substantively, the need for speed
features as a central element in the debate over the EU’s historical develop-
ment and potential future. Theoretically, findings about speed help us assess
the utility of the tools we use to study the Union. Using different data sets
and covariates, four previous survival analyses reached different conclusions
about which factors produce or avert EU legislative paralysis. But each study
made unjustified methodological assumptions that undermine the reliability
of their inferences. In this paper I identified these problems, then relaxed the
assumptions and fit a Cox model with non-proportional covariate effects to
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Golub’s 2002 EU decision-making data, the only data set that directly
addresses the effects of institutional changes and EU enlargements, and the
only one that codes for numerous state-changes in time-varying covariates.
This choice was also a deliberate attempt to improve the signal to noise ratio
by focusing exclusively on Directives, the most important type of legislative
instrument.
Substantively, the results indicate that formal voting rules mattered
throughout the EU’s history. The negative effects of the Luxembourg Compro-
mise, if they existed at all, have been dramatically overstated, since QMV
significantly expedited decision-making long before the SEA, and the effects
of QMV were no greater after the SEA than before. And, although the effect
of QMV has diminished in the post-Maastricht period, it remains significant.
The improved model specification also reveals for the first time that the effects
of variables such as QMV wear off as the Council negotiates legislative
proposals. This provides important lessons, for example that in some ways
the supposed ‘dark ages’ of the EU were actually its heydays: during the first
18 months that a proposal spent under consideration in the Council, the effect
of QMV was larger in the pre-SEA period than during 1993–9. As for the
perennial deepening versus widening debate, enlargement of the EU from 6
to 15 states did not slow decision-making speed. If anything, it induced faster
decisions. Nor did expanding the agenda to include new policy sectors
compromise legislative pace. What does appear to bog down the process is
the presence of a member state government with extreme preferences – in this
analysis the ‘Thatcher effect’ – and the increased role of the European Parlia-
ment. As the EU moves forward and considers further reforms and enlarge-
ment, we should therefore count on but not overestimate the positive effects
of broadening the scope of QMV, nor should we be overly concerned about
paralysis in new policy fields or as a result of adding more member states,
unless they substantially increase Council preference heterogeneity. At the
same time, shifting from unanimity to co-decision or from QMV with EP
consultation to co-decision might improve democratic legitimacy but
probably will not speed up decision-making, and could make it slower.
Theoretically, the findings vindicate the explanatory power of formal
approaches – spatial models and especially coalition theory – more than
perspectives that privilege informal norms. Provisions for QMV expedite
decision-making by shrinking the core, enlarging the win-set of the status
quo, and raising the proportion of winning coalitions. Adding unabsorbed
veto players and increasing the heterogeneity of decision-makers slow
decisions by enlarging the core, reducing the win-set and decreasing the
proportion of winning coalitions. But coalition theory might explain one
important finding that spatial models cannot: adding veto players through
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EU enlargement appears to have accelerated decision-making. Spatial models
could account at most for neutral effects from enlargement (if all new states
were totally absorbed, the core remains unchanged), but according to
coalition theory decisions would get faster if the formation of connected
winning coalitions in low-dimensional conflict space became easier. Informal
approaches perform poorly. It appears that the Council has never operated
under a unanimity norm, and that any informal dynamics associated with
deliberative democracy are insignificant, since adding the EP as an extra voice
dramatically slowed down decision-making.
Of course this paper represents only a first step towards a better grasp
of what determines EU decision-making speed and what this tells us about
our theoretical tools. Further advances in survival analysis methodology and
formal theory, as well as more data, will deepen our understanding and might
challenge the findings presented here. But the blueprint I offer – to use Cox
models that account for state-changes and non-proportional effects, to
develop TVCs that provide a long-term periodic measure of preference
heterogeneity, to focus attention on the most important type of legislative
instrument, and to concentrate more on the theoretical concepts of the core
and the proportion of winning coalitions than on informal norms – should
provide a good starting point.
Notes
I am grateful to Gerald Schneider and several anonymous referees for their
comments, to the Nuffield Foundation for financial support (Social Science Small
Grant H3047500), and to Dave Collett for extensive discussions about survival
analysis.
1 Neo-functionalists, constructivists and historical institutionalists claim that
socialization from previous integration, ‘lock-in’ effects and the growing
benefits of further deepening should cause the preferences of member states
as well as social actors to converge over time. If so, Council heterogeneity
should steadily decrease as actors grow more cooperative and pro-European
(Checkel, 2003; Lewis, 2005; Pahre, 1995; Pierson, 1998). Available evidence
appears to contradict this view.
2 Very high dimensionality renders all coalitions connected (Garrett and
Tsebelis, 1996; Hosli and van Deemen, 2002), but evidence suggests relatively
low dimensionality in the EU (Mattila, 2004; Selck, 2006; Thomson et al.,
2004).
3 Unlike ordinary least squares regression (Jupille, 2004; Sloot and Verschuren,
1990), survival analysis makes full use of information about legislative
proposals that were right-censored, e.g. withdrawn rather than adopted or
still under consideration when the study ended. It also relaxes the very
demanding assumption that residuals are normally distributed.
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4 Besides the Cox, two other alternatives are also available, in the form of
discrete-time logistic regression and spline-smoothing of the survival times
(Beck et al., 1998; Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 2004; Royston and Parmar,
2002; Yamaguchi, 1991). But these methods offer no clear advantage over the
Cox, apart from an improved ability to study the (substantively meaningless)
baseline hazard (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 2004: 88, 90), and both come
with their own drawbacks (Golub 2007). Although both these methods,
especially spline-based models, deserve further attention in subsequent
research, for the remainder of this paper I focus on the advantages over
previous EU survival studies that a Cox model provides.
5 The effect of QMV ‘wears off’ when the hazard ratio QMV/UNANIMITY =
1. The numerator, exp(3.122 – 0.428ln(t)), equals 1 when t = 1472 days, or
four years.
6 The effect of QMV remains greater than the effect of QMVPOSTSEA as long
as the hazard ratio is greater than 1. Thus [3.122 – 0.428ln(t)] > [2.11 –
0.224ln(t)] holds until t > 143 days, or about five months.
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